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I.  INTRODUCTION 
At its core, trademark law aims to prevent consumer confusion and protect 
business investment with a property right.1  Business entities utilize trademarks 
to distinguish their products from others available on the market.2  When 
investigating allegations of trademark infringement, courts embark on a case-by-
case inquiry that considers a number of factors surrounding marketplace 
conditions and behavior.3  The inquiry overall seeks to reduce consumer 
research costs by evaluating whether or not consumers would be confused by 
the infringing mark.4 
When Congress enacted the Lanham Act in 1946, it streamlined existing 
trademark legislation5 and codified certain prevailing common law consumer 
protections.6  Two provisions stemming from the common law provide 
remedies to mark owners: § 1116 for injunctive relief and § 1117 for monetary 
relief.7  Specifically, § 1117 provided for damages through disgorgement, which 
allows a mark owner to recover the percentage of its economic loss attributable 
to an infringer’s illegal activities.8  Historically, mark owners were only eligible 
to receive disgorgement damages in instances of willful infringement.9  
Innocent infringement could not be subject to disgorgement. 
To ensure effective consumer protection, Congress has amended the 
Lanham Act nearly twenty times since its inception.10  An amendment in 1999 
sought to clarify the statute’s protections regarding trademark dilution, defined 
as the diminished distinctiveness of famous trademarks.11  Because Congress 
sought to criminalize only willful instances of dilution, it added additional 
                                                                                                                   
 1 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:33 
(4th ed. 2014). 
 2 Id. § 3:2. 
 3 Danielle Conway-Jones, Remedying Trademark Infringement: The Role of Bad Faith in Awarding an 
Account of Defendant’s Profits, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 863, 872–73 (2002). 
 4 Id. 
 5 Blake R. Bertagna, Poaching Profits: An Examination of the Ability of a Trademark owner to Recover 
an Infringer’s Profits Under the Lanham Act as Amended in 1999, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 257, 262 
(2008). 
 6 Mark A. Thurmon, Confusion Codified: Why Trademark Remedies Make No Sense, 17 J. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 245, 300 (2010). 
 7 15 U.S.C. §§ 1116–1117 (2012). 
 8 Dennis S. Corgill, Measuring the Gains of Trademark Infringement, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1909, 
1910 (1997). 
 9 Thurmon, supra note 6, at 283. 
 10 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 5:5. 
 11 Bertanga, supra note 5, at 266. 
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language to § 1117.12  However, this addition perplexed courts, making judges 
unsure whether or not the amendment removed the need for mark owners to 
prove willfulness before receiving disgorgement damages.13  For the past fifteen 
years, this uncertainty has created a frustrating circuit split that has divided 
judges on the interpretation of a willfulness requirement. 
A June 2014 decision from the district court of Connecticut, Romag Fasteners, 
Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., provides a clear illustration of the confusion caused by the 
Lanham Act’s 1999 amendment.14  In that case, Romag Fasteners designed 
patent-protected magnetic purse fasteners.15  It distinguished its fasteners from 
others on the market by using a “Romag” trademark.16  In 2002, Romag entered 
an agreement with Fossil, Inc., another handbag manufacturer,17 permitting 
Fossil’s use of Romag fasteners in its products.18  Several years later, Romag 
Fasteners discovered Fossil counterfeited and purchased fasteners beyond the 
scope of their agreement.19  The parties reached a settlement agreement 
regarding the use of these counterfeited fasteners.20  Romag Fasteners, however, 
continued to find its fasteners in Fossil products in department stores in the 
years following their initial allegations.21  As a result, it filed suit in the district 
court of Connecticut.22  
Romag Fasteners raised a number of claims against Fossil, including 
trademark infringement.23  In the first phase of the trial, the jury found that 
Fossil infringed Romag Fasteners’ mark24 and determined that one percent of 
Fossil’s profits were attributable to its infringing actions.25  This percentage 
constituted disgorgement damages, requiring the jury to award Romag 
Fasteners a portion of Fossil’s profits to compensate for its economic losses.26  
                                                                                                                   
 12 145 CONG. REC. H6363-01 (daily ed. July 26, 1999) (adding the phrase “or a willful violation 
under section 1125(c) of this title”). 
 13 Conway-Jones, supra note 3, at 863–64 (describing circuit courts’ confusion over awarding 
mark owners’ disgorgement damages and providing mark owners with a portion of an infringer’s 
profits). 
 14 Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 3d 85 (D. Conn. 2014). 
 15 Id. at 91. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. at 92. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. at 95. 
 23 Id. at 96. 
 24 Id. at 90. 
 25 Id. at 106. 
 26 Id. 
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The jury’s disgorgement calculations returned $90,759.36 of Fossil’s profits 
under an unjust enrichment rationale and $6,704,046.00 under a deterrence 
theory.27  Fossil contested this award.28  Although the jury found Fossil liable 
for trademark infringement, it did not find this infringement was willful.29  
Fossil then questioned the jury’s damage award by arguing that willfulness was a 
prerequisite for awarding disgorgement.30  However, Romag Fasteners 
countered, stating that the 1999 amendment to the Lanham Act effectively 
abrogated any preexisting willfulness requirement.31  
In its lengthy discussion of disgorgement, the District Court of Connecticut 
highlighted the uncertainty surrounding willful infringement resulting from the 
1999 amendment and the resulting circuit split.32  After considering the various 
approaches employed by the circuit courts, the Romag Fasteners, Inc. court held 
willfulness was a prerequisite for awarding disgorgement damages.33  This 
finding was based on the court’s interpretation of the 1999 amendment, which 
did not indicate an abrogation of the willfulness requirement.34  Because the 
jury did not find Fossil had willfully infringed Romag Fastener’s mark, the court 
concluded that Romag Fasteners was not eligible to receive disgorgement 
damages at Fossil’s expense.35  
Although this case was decided within the Second Circuit, Romag Fasteners, 
Inc. highlights the universal need for clarity in the relationship between willful 
infringement and disgorgement damages across circuits.  Originally, § 1117 of 
the Lanham Act did not contain any language pertaining to willfulness, as the 
statute imputed the willfulness requirement contained in the common law.36  
While Congress’s 1999 amendment intended to criminalize willful instance of 
trademark dilution,37 judges remain confused about whether the amendment 
had any effect on the disgorgement of profits unlawfully gained from non-
famous marks. 
                                                                                                                   
 27 Id. at 90. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. at 91. 
 30 Id. at 109. 
 31 Id. at 107. 
 32 Id. at 110. 
 33 Id. at 109 (“[T]his Court is persuaded by those authorities that have concluded that a finding 
of willfulness remains a requirement for an award of defendant’s profits in this Circuit.”). 
 34 Id. at 111 (“[T]he legislative history gives no support to the argument that the 1999 
amendments were intended to abrogate the common-law willfulness requirement.”). 
 35 Id. 
 36 Conway-Jones, supra note 3, at 869. 
 37 145 CONG. REC. H6363-01 (daily ed. July 26, 1999). 
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The perplexity experienced by circuit courts is apparent in other non-
dilution infringement actions decided after Congress’s amendment.  Since 1999, 
only one circuit court, the Tenth, has affirmatively retained a willfulness 
requirement in the disgorgement context.38  Three circuits have abrogated 
willfulness from its disgorgement analysis completely.39  More starkly, four 
circuits have expressly declined to address the role of willfulness, which serves 
as evidence of the ambiguity resulting from Congress’s actions in 1999.40  
Specifically, courts within the Second Circuit remain deeply divided over 
willfulness’s proper place in awarding disgorgement damages.41  This 
ambivalence and uncertainty has plagued courts for far too long.  To properly 
inform mark owners of disgorgement’s availability and potential infringers of 
potential liability, a clear stance on the requirement of willfulness for the 
disgorgement remedy is necessary.     
This Note seeks to determine willfulness’ proper place when awarding 
damages disgorged from an infringer’s profits.  Part II of this Note will provide 
the necessary context for the willfulness debate.  It describes the purpose of 
trademark protection and various legislative actions taken to properly preserve 
that protection.  In addition, it also details the three ways circuit courts have 
approached willfulness in the disgorgement context.   
Part III then argues that courts should require a showing of willfulness 
before awarding disgorgement damages in infringement actions.  More 
specifically, it will argue that Congress’s silence on willful infringement beyond 
dilution indicates a desire to retain the common law requirement of willfulness.  
Part III will also argue that damage-based policies of compensation, unjust 
enrichment, and deterrence are furthered when willfulness is required.  It then 
concludes by showing that abrogating a willfulness requirement extends the 
scope of the 1999 amendment beyond its intended purpose.  Finally, Part IV 
will reemphasize that all courts should adopt the Romag Fasteners, Inc. court’s 
persuasive reasoning by requiring willfulness before awarding an accounting of 
a defendant’s profits.  
                                                                                                                   
 38 See Western Diversified Servs., Inc. v. Hyundai Motor America, Inc., 427 F.3d 1269 (10th 
Cir. 2005). 
 39 The three circuits are the Third, Fourth, and Fifth.  See Quick Technologies, Inc. v. Sage 
Group PLC, 313 F.3d 338 (5th Cir. 2002); Banjo Buddies, Inc. v. Renosky, 399 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 
2005); Synergistic Intern., LLC v. Korman, 470 F.3d 162 (4th Cir. 2006). 
 40 These four circuits include the First, Second, Eighth, and Ninth.  See Fishman Transducers, 
Inc. v. Paul, 684 F.3d 187 (1st Cir. 2012); Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 3d 85 
(D. Conn. 2014); Masters v. UHS of Delaware, Inc., 631 F.3d 464 (8th Cir. 2011); M2 Software 
Inc. v. Viacom Inc., 223 Fed. App’x 653 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 41 Romag Fasteners, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 3d at 108. 
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II.  BACKGROUND  
The Romag Fasteners, Inc. decision indicates the continued uncertainty 
regarding willfulness’ role in awarding disgorgement damages.  To properly 
assess the existing circuit split and to propose an appropriate solution, this Note 
provides a history of the courts’ division.  This Part specifically describes the 
relevant background, policy, and case law pertaining to the circuit split, 
beginning with a brief description of trademark law’s purpose and the remedies 
available under § 1117.  A discussion of the 1999 amendment of § 1117 and 
different formulations of willfulness follows.  Finally, this Part concludes by 
describing the three ways circuit courts view willfulness’ application to 
disgorgement: (1) as a requirement, (2) as a mere consideration, or (3) as a 
nebulous question worth avoiding.  
A.  DEFINING TRADEMARKS AND TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT  
A trademark is a symbol or phrase identifying a good or service’s origin.42  
Trademark protection’s primary purpose is to distinguish these goods and 
services from others available on the market.43  Trademarks also aid with 
advertising by attributing goods or services to a particular source44 and serve as 
a symbol of a business’ success.45  By identifying potentially desirable products 
or products satisfactory to customers in the past, trademarks can provide their 
owners with economic rewards.46  The heart of trademark law, however, seeks 
to protect consumers from confusion and deceit in the marketplace.47  If 
consumers are confused and unable to distinguish between similar products 
within the market, the uncertainty impedes healthy economic competition.48 
Trademark owners can respond to possible consumer confusion created by 
two similar marks by establishing a claim for trademark infringement.49  The 
central inquiry in an infringement analysis is whether there is a likelihood of 
confusion between the products produced by the mark owner and the alleged 
infringer.50  Generally, circuit courts establish their own distinct multi-factor 
                                                                                                                   
 42 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 3:1. 
 43 Id. § 3:2. 
 44 Id.  
 45 Id. 
 46 Bertagna, supra note 5, at 262. 
 47 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 2:33. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Conway-Jones, supra note 3, at 872. 
 50 Id. 
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tests to evaluate the likelihood of confusion.51  Many courts use an infringement 
analysis evaluating numerous non-exhaustive factors.52  These factors can 
include whether: (1) the marks physically resemble each other, (2) the products 
identified by the marks are similar, (3) the products were targeted at similar 
consumers, and (4) the conditions for purchasing the respective products were 
comparable.53  Although these factors are persuasive, the unique nature of 
infringement claims requires a case-by-case analysis.54  In all, courts consider the 
totality of the circumstances in evaluating alleged infringement.55  
B.  THE LANHAM ACT AND DISGORGEMENT OF PROFITS 
The Lanham Act was enacted in 1946 as trademark owners’ safeguard 
against infringing behavior.56  Fifteen U.S.C. 1125 of the Lanham Act codified 
the likelihood of confusion test to guide courts throughout an infringement 
analysis.57  The test also describes the categories of claims covered by the Act.58  
These claims include the infringement of unregistered trademarks, false 
advertising, false attribution, trademark dilution, and trade dress infringement.59 
Before the Lanham Act’s enactment, the common law allowed trademark 
owners to receive monetary relief from courts of law and injunctive relief from 
courts of equity.60  Congress streamlined these distinctive infringement 
remedies by providing for injunctive relief in 15 U.S.C. § 1116 and monetary 
relief in 15 U.S.C. § 1117.61  Before 1999, § 1117(a) did not contain any 
reference to willfulness and read:   
When a violation of any right of the registrant of a mark 
registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, a violation under 
section 125(a) or (d) of this title . . . [has] been established in any 
civil action arising under this chapter, the plaintiff shall be 
entitled . . . subject to the principles of equity, to recover (1) 
                                                                                                                   
 51 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 23:1. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Conway-Jones, supra note 3, at 872–73. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. at 873.  
 56 Corgill, supra note 8, at 1910. 
 57 15 U.S.C. 1125 (2015); see also Thurmon, supra note 6, at 252 n.29. 
 58 15 U.S.C. § 1125. 
 59 Id.; see also Thurmon, supra note 6, at 252 n.29. 
 60 Thurmon, supra note 6, at 267. 
 61 15 U.S.C. §§ 1116–1117. 
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defendant’s profits, (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, 
and (3) the costs of the action. 
The first category of monetary damages—an accounting of the infringer’s 
profits—is a known as disgorgement and is popular remedy for trademark 
owners.62  Disgorgement’s equitable origin forces the court to weigh the 
individual circumstances of each case before giving a trademark owner an award 
of profits.63  An infringer’s profits may be awarded absent any actual damages 
to the plaintiff, but are never a matter of right and may be denied if the court 
finds a different remedy more appropriate.64   
Disgorgement damages serve a number of remedial policies.  When a mark 
owner and an infringer compete in the same market, disgorging a defendant’s 
profit serves a compensatory purpose.65  By awarding disgorgement damages, 
courts seek to provide mark owners with a rough estimate of their lost sales 
attributable directly to the infringer’s illegal activities.66  This remedy assumes 
the mark owner would have gained the entirety of an infringer’s profits absent 
the infringement.67  Because of this generous assumption, courts find 
disgorgement damages can satisfactorily provide for a mark owner’s lost sales in 
a competitive market.68  
If a mark owner and an infringer do not directly compete, disgorgement 
serves alternative purposes.69  Without a competitive relationship between the 
parties, the compensatory rationale is not well-served.70  However, 
disgorgement damages can deter potential infringers by eliminating the 
economic incentive of infringement.71  Additionally, disgorgement may 
counteract any unjust enrichment gained at the expense of a mark owner.72  A 
disgorgement award absent actual damages is usually predicated on either unjust 
enrichment or deterrence theories.73  
                                                                                                                   
 62 Corgill, supra note 8, at 1910. 
 63 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 30:59. 
 64 Corgill, supra note 8, at 1926. 
 65 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 30:59 (describing disgorgement as a way to compensate a mark 
owner for sales lost to an infringer). 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Corgill, supra note 8, at 1928. 
 72 Id. at 1932 (defining unjust enrichment as profits unjust for an infringer to retain). 
 73 Western Diversified Servs., Inc. v. Hyundai Motor America, Inc., 427 F.3d 1269, 1272 (10th 
Cir. 2005). 
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C.  THE FEDERAL DILUTION ACT OF 1995, THE LANHAM ACT’S 1999 
AMENDMENT, AND WILLFULNESS DEFINED 
While § 1125 of the Lanham Act created monetary remedies for wronged 
mark owners, it did not comprehensively describe remedies for all forms of 
infringement.74  Courts found nothing in the Lanham Act relevant to the use of 
similar marks on non-competing products.75  In response, Congress created the 
Federal Dilution Act of 1995.76  Dilution occurs when a product denoted by an 
infringing mark affects a famous mark’s distinctiveness.77  The plain language of 
the Federal Dilution Act gives a mark owner access to the monetary remedies 
of section § 1117 if dilution was willfully committed.78  However, Congress felt 
further clarification was required.79    
Hence, in 1999, Congress amended § 1117.80  With the changes, the section 
now reads: “[When] a violation under section 1125(a) or (d) of this title, or a 
willful violation under section 1125(c) of this title [has been established] . . . the 
plaintiff shall be entitled . . . to recover (1) defendant’s profits.”81  The 
remaining language of this section remained the same.82  The purpose of this 
additional language was to “harmonize section 1117(a) with the recent Federal 
Dilution Act of 1995.”83  Some scholars speculate that the amendment sought 
to address online infringement and cyber-squatters.84  However, Congress was 
instead concerned that the remedies for trademark dilution under federal law 
were not properly articulated.85  In the same amendment, Congress sought to 
cancel a diluting mark ex ante, with an injunction, instead of ex post, with 
damages.86  By imposing an injunction before dilution occurred, Congress 
“allow[ed] the right to oppose or seek cancellation of a mark hopefully before 
harm has occurred.”87    
                                                                                                                   
 74 Bertagna, supra note 5, at 265. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, Stat. 985 (1996). 
 77 Id.; see also Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 105 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(describing the Starbucks trademark as “famous” under the Lanham Act and subject to 
protection from dilution). 
 78 Bertagna, supra note 5, at 267. 
 79 Id. at 266. 
 80 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Romag Fastners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 3d 85, 110 (D. Conn. 2014). 
 84 Bertagna, supra note 5, at 297. 
 85 145 CONG. REC. H6363-01 (daily ed. July 26, 1999). 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
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However, as discussed, Congress’s addition of language concerning 
willfulness in 1999 has affected damages awards and confused judges 
nationwide.88  Specifically, it is difficult to pinpoint an exact definition of 
willfulness, which is evaluated based on the facts of a particular dispute.89  
Overall, courts agree with the distinction between willfulness’ function in the 
civil and criminal contexts.90  Willfulness distinguishes intentional conduct from 
accidental actions in the civil context;91 in criminal law, the defendant acts 
willfully if he seeks to cause injury with the awareness of his actions’ unlawful 
nature.92  
Without more guidance from Congress, however, circuit courts have crafted 
their own unique definitions of willfulness in the trademark context.93  
Typically, these definitions mimic the criminal law’s treatment of willful 
conduct.94  Infringers must act with the intent to deceive or confuse consumers 
in order to be guilty of willful infringement.95  In other words, infringers must 
be aware that their actions (1) violate the law and (2) deprive mark owners of 
their protected trademark rights.96  Despite inherent variations, circuit courts 
approach and apply willfulness in one of three ways, as discussed below. 
D.  WILLFULNESS AS A REQUIREMENT FOR DISGORGEMENT 
While wrestling with the definition of willfulness, courts have also struggled 
with applying the 1999 amendment’s language to determine the monetary 
damages available under § 1117.97  Although Congress sought to clarify the 
remedies available to victims of dilution in the 1999 Amendment, it remained 
silent about how the newly added willfulness language would affect the owners 
of non-famous marks.98  Circuit courts remain divided and uncertain about 
willfulness’ importance in the disgorgement context.99  
1.  The Tenth Circuit’s Requirement of Willfulness.  The only circuit court 
retaining willfulness as a prerequisite for awarding disgorgement damages is the 
                                                                                                                   
 88 Bertagna, supra note 5, at 268. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 268–69. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. at 268. 
 94 Id. at 271–72. 
 95 Id. at 272. 
 96 Id.  
 97 Id. at 260. 
 98 Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 3d 85, 110–11 (D. Conn. 2014). 
 99 Id. at 188. 
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Tenth Circuit.100  In 2005, the court in Western Diversified Servs., Inc. justified the 
role of willfulness in allowing disgorgement damages absent actual damages in 
order to balance the principles of equity.101  The plaintiff in this case marketed 
automobile warranties with two registered marks: “advantage” and “advantage 
plus.”102  Several years later, the defendant began marketing warranties using the 
same language.103  When the defendant refused to stop using these phrases at 
the plaintiff’s request, the plaintiff filed suit for trademark infringement.104  
The Tenth Circuit ultimately reversed the lower court’s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the defendant because the plaintiff raised genuine issues of 
material fact regarding the willfulness of the defendant’s infringement.105  In 
recognizing that the potential for inequality is heightened by the possibility of a 
mark owner receiving a windfall through an accounting of infringer’s profits, as 
well as the potential punitive effect on infringers, the court held that willful 
infringement must be established before providing a trademark owner with 
disgorgement damages.106  However, “[e]ven with a finding of willfulness, a 
court may still exercise its discretion to reduce or even eliminate a profit award” 
in the need of equity.107  Therefore, the court enumerated a two-step process 
for an award of profits: “(1) a finding of willfulness or bad faith; and (2) a 
weighing of the equities.”108 
The Tenth Circuit further justified this two-step process based on various 
remedial theories, stating that an award of profits in the absence of actual 
damages is usually based on either an unjust enrichment or deterrence 
rationale.109  If infringement is not willful, courts should merely award remedies 
to compensate a mark owner’s reputational loss.110  However, when someone 
willfully infringes another’s trademark rights, court should instead focus on an 
infringer’s conduct and “unauthorized use” under an unjust an enrichment 
theory.111  In the court’s view, the unjust enrichment rationale conceptualizes 
trademark infringement as interference with an owner’s “protected property 
                                                                                                                   
 100 Western Diversified Servs., Inc. v. Hyundai Motor America, Inc., 427 F.3d 1269 (10th Cir. 
2005). 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. at 1271. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. at 1277. 
 106 Id. at 1272–73. 
 107 Id. at 1273.  
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. at 1272. 
 110 Corgill, supra note 8, at 1931. 
 111 Id. at 1968. 
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rights.”112  Willful infringers act with the intent to cause injury and knowledge 
of their actions’ unlawfulness,113 obtaining profits by encroaching on a mark 
owner’s rights.114  Therefore, under an unjust enrichment rational, disgorgement 
returns profits unjustly retained by infringers to their proper owner.115 
A deterrence rationale is similarly applicable to instances of willful 
infringement.116  This rationale, in contrast to a compensatory purpose,117 
informs the public of an action’s wrongful nature in order to prevent future 
infringement.118  “Without the dire threat of an accounting for the purpose of 
deterrence,” individuals will be encouraged to infringe on trademarks without 
certain punishment.119  The promise of disgorgement can disgorgement can 
dissuade future infringement with the promise of punishment.120  However, 
these damages must be cautiously awarded, as the Lanham Act prohibits 
punitive trademark damages.121  
Disgorgement damages properly strike the balance between deterring and 
punishing infringers.122  They remove economic incentives of infringement 
while “[leaving] the infringer no worse off than if the infringer had not 
infringed in the first place.”123  Because deterrence theory seeks to make an 
example of unlawful conduct with the aim of preventing future potential 
infringers from choosing to infringe, it is not particularly applicable to non-
willful infringement.124  Like an unjust enrichment rationale of recovery, 
deterrence theory depends on the infringer’s wrongful action, not the injury 
suffered by the mark owner.125      
In the court’s view, the unjust enrichment rationale conceptualizes 
trademark ownership as a property right.126  Trademark infringement interferes 
                                                                                                                   
 112 Western Diversified Servs., Inc., 427 F.3d at 1272. 
 113 Bertagna, supra note 5, at 272. 
 114 Corgill, supra note 8, at 1931. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. at 1929. 
 117 Id. at 1926. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Bryan M. Otake, The Continuing Viability of The Deterrence Rationale In Trademark Infringement 
Accounts, 5 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 221, 243 (1998). 
 120 Id. (detailing the appeal of infringement by large corporate infringers in the absence of 
disgorgement damages as a deterrent). 
 121 Corgill, supra note 8, at 1926. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. at 1929. 
 125 Western Diversified Servs., Inc. v. Hyundai Motor America, Inc., 427 F.3d 1269, 1273 (10th 
Cir. 2005). 
 126 Id. 
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with these “protected property rights.”127  Altogether, after considering 
rationales of unjust enrichment and deterrence and properly scrutinizing a 
disgorgement award on equitable grounds, the Tenth Circuit views willfulness 
as a necessary requirement.128 
E.  WILLFULNESS AS A CONSIDERATION FOR DISGORGEMENT 
1.  The Fifth Circuit’s Factor-Based Consideration of Willfulness.  In light of the 
1999 Lanham Act amendment, several circuits instead abrogated the willfulness 
requirement from their disgorgement analyses.  The Fifth Circuit, for example, 
defined willful infringement as a mere equitable consideration for disgorgement 
instead of an ironclad prerequisite.129  In Quick Technologies v. Sage Group PLC, 
the plaintiff expanded its business into the database industry,130 using the mark 
“SAGE INFORMATION SYSTEM” to market its new business.131  
Simultaneously, the defendant created a national brand using the mark 
“Sage.”132  The parties attempted to negotiate use of the “SAGE 
INFORMATION SYSTEM” mark.133  After these negotiations broke down, 
the defendant filed an application to register its “Sage” mark with the Patent 
and Trademark Office.134  The plaintiff subsequently alleged trademark 
infringement.135   
In considering a disgorgement damage award, the Fifth Circuit recognized 
its long-standing dedication to “[achieving] equity between or among the 
parties.”136  The court expressed concerns about providing mark owners with a 
windfall of an infringer’s profits if an injunction would provide an adequate 
remedy.137  While the court acknowledged the Tenth Circuit’s adoption of a 
willfulness requirement,138 it refused to impose one itself.139  Instead, it 
employed a factor-based approach.140  Before awarding an accounting of a 
defendant’s profits, the Fifth Circuit considers the following: “(1) whether the 
                                                                                                                   
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Quick Technologies, Inc. v. Sage Group PLC, 313 F.3d 338, 349 (5th Cir. 2002).  
 130 Id. at 342. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. at 347 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 137 Id. at 350. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. at 349. 
 140 Id. 
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defendant had the intent to confuse or deceive, (2) whether sales have been 
diverted, (3) the adequacy of other remedies, (4) any unreasonable delay by the 
plaintiff in asserting his rights, (5) the public interest in making the misconduct 
unprofitable, and (6) whether it is a case of palming off.”141 
2.  The Third Circuit’s Application of the Fifth Circuit’s Test.  The Third Circuit 
subsequently applied Quick Technologies’ factor analysis while considering the 
congressional intent behind the 1999 amendment of § 1117142 in Banjo Buddies, 
Inc.  The plaintiff in this case sold a popular fishing lure set called the Banjo 
Minnow.143  The defendant was a member of the Board of Directors during the 
Banjo Minnow’s success in the market.144  During his time in office, the 
defendant suggested a new lure set called the Bionic Minnow to his fellow 
board members.145  Several members expressed reservations about the idea, so 
the defendant began marketing the Bionic Minnow through his own 
company.146  The plaintiff then sued under § 1125 of the Lanham Act.147 
After employing the Fifth Circuit’s factor analysis,148 the Third Circuit 
allowed the plaintiff’s recovery of the defendant’s profits.149  Although the court 
considered willfulness, it did not require a finding of such.150  While Third Circuit 
decisions previously required a trademark owner to prove an infringer’s 
willfulness before receiving disgorgement damages, the Banjo Buddies court 
found the 1999 amendment to the Lanham Act superseded this requirement.151  
Notably, the court found the amendment’s plain language only applied to 
trademark dilution, not infringement of non-famous marks.152  The court also 
presumed Congress was aware that most courts had adopted a willfulness 
requirement in their disgorgement analyses.153  Therefore, the Third Circuit 
determined that Congress’s explicit limitation of willfulness to trademark 
                                                                                                                   
 141 Id. 
 142 Banjo Buddies, Inc. v. Renosky, 399 F.3d 168, 175 (3d Cir. 2005).  
 143 Id. at 171. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id.  
 146 Id. at 171–72. 
 147 Id. at 172. 
 148 Id. at 177. 
 149 Id. at 180. 
 150 Id. at 171. 
 151 Id. at 174. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. (citing Scheidemann v. INS, 83 F.3d 1517, 1525 (3d Cir. 1996) (“[W]e must presume that 
Congress is aware of existing judicial interpretations of statutes.”(alteration in original))). 
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dilution was a deliberate effort to abrogate the requirement in other parts of 
§ 1117.154   
3.  The Fourth Circuit Removes Willfulness.  The Fourth Circuit similarly viewed 
willfulness as a mere factor in awarding disgorgement damages in the 2006 case 
of Synergistic Intern., LLC v. Korman.155  The plaintiff repaired and installed glass 
doors in this case,156 advertising with the trademark “GLASS DOCTOR®.”157  
The defendant owned her own windshield repair business called “THE 
WINDSHIELD DOCTOR,”158 but, unaware of the plaintiff’s trademark, 
advertised her company in the local yellow pages as “GLASS DOCTOR.”159  
Although the defendant eventually stopped using the “GLASS DOCTOR” 
language, she believed “THE WINDSHIELD DOCTOR” was protected under 
trademark law and continued using the language to advertise her business.160  
Subsequently, the plaintiff filed suit for unfair competition and trademark 
infringement under the Lanham Act.161   
The Fourth Circuit ultimately agreed with the Fifth and Third Circuits.162  
According to the court, if an infringer did not act willfully, disgorgement 
damages should not be imposed.163  However, willfulness did not serve as an 
ironclad requirement for disgorgement.164  Interestingly, the court also noted 
that a willfulness requirement would have been more persuasive before the 
1999 amendment.165  Because the amendment’s language was added in the 
disjunctive, however, the Fourth Circuit found that willfulness was merely a 
“highly pertinent factor.”166  
                                                                                                                   
 154 Id. (citing Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (“Where Congress indicates 
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is 
generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposefully in the disparate inclusion or 
exclusion.”)). 
 155 470 F.3d 162 (4th Cir. 2006). 
 156 Id. at 166. 
 157 Id.  
 158 Id. at 167. 
 159 Id.  
 160 Id. at 168. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. at 175. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. at 175 n.13. 
 166 Id. 
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F.  AMBIVALENCE TOWARDS WILLFULNESS  
1.  The First Circuit Stalls.  Although the previously discussed circuit courts 
have taken a clear stance on willfulness, other courts continue to struggle with 
the Lanham Act’s 1999 amendment.  These latter courts choose not to directly 
address whether willfulness is required in a disgorgement analysis167 but have 
nonetheless recognized the existing circuit split and generally assume a 
requirement of willfulness.168 
The First Circuit applied such an assumption169 in Fishman Transducers, Inc.  
In that case, the plaintiff manufactured amplification equipment used in 
guitars.170  The defendant, a vendor of consumer goods, sold guitars and 
accidentally misidentified the instruments’ amplification equipment as belonging 
to the plaintiff’s.171  In response, the plaintiff brought a number of claims, 
including trademark infringement.172  In reaching its holding, the court 
distinguished the role of willfulness in “ordinary infringement” actions from 
willful ones.173  In the context of ordinary infringement, willfulness typically 
helps courts choose the best remedy for a particular case.174  While willfulness is 
not a requirement for awarding every category of damages, stare decisis in the 
First Circuit dictated that the court should typically require willfulness as a 
prerequisite for disgorgement damages.175  The First Circuit did not extend its 
analysis beyond recognizing the actions of these other courts. 
2.  The Eighth Circuit Avoids The Question.  The Eighth Circuit merely 
recognized the prevailing circuit split without adding its own commentary.176  In 
Masters v. UHS of Delaware, Inc., the plaintiff alleged that the defendant infringed 
on its trademark identifying her deceased husband’s medical treatment 
programs.177  The court briefly addressed the circuit split in its opinion’s final 
footnote.178  After acknowledging courts’ divisions on the questions, the Eighth 
Circuit chose not to decide the question.179  However, it recognized it would 
                                                                                                                   
 167 Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 3d 85, 108–09 (D. Conn. 2014). 
 168 Id. 
 169 Fishman Transducers, Inc. v. Paul, 634 F.3d 187, 191 (1st Cir. 2012). 
 170 Id. at 189. 
 171 Id. 
 172 Id. 
 173 Id. at 191. 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Masters v. UHS of Delaware, Inc., 631 F.3d 464 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 177 Id. at 468. 
 178 Id. at 472 n.2. 
 179 Id. 
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likely require willfulness before awarding disgorgement damages, based on the 
analyses of other courts.180   
3.  The Ninth Circuit Dismisses Willfulness.  The Ninth Circuit was similarly 
dismissive of the willfulness question.  In M2 Software v. Viacom Inc., the plaintiff 
sued the defendant for trademark infringement and dilution.181  On appeal, the 
plaintiff argued that the Lanham Act’s 1999 amendment clearly eliminated any 
requirement of willfulness.182  However, the Ninth Circuit characterized this 
assertion as a “shaky assumption” before quickly dismissing it.183  
4.  The Second Circuit as a Quintessential Example of the Circuit Split.  Before the 
1999 Lanham Act amendment, the Second Circuit viewed willful infringement 
as a requirement for disgorgement damages.184  A prime example of this strict 
application took place in George Basch Co. v. Blue Coral Inc. and involved a 
plaintiff who manufactured metal polish while using the “NEVER-DULL” 
mark.185  The defendant, who sold polishing products, misappropriated this 
mark, prompting the plaintiff to sue for trademark infringement.186  Like the 
Tenth Circuit in Western Diversified Servs., Inc., the court was apprehensive about 
a mark owner receiving a windfall from an award of a defendant’s profits.187  To 
prevent this unnecessary windfall and to avoid potentially unjust treatment of 
innocent infringers, the Second Circuit plainly asserted, “a plaintiff must prove 
that an infringer acted with willful deception before the infringer’s profits are 
recoverable by way of an accounting.”188  
The Lanham Act’s 1999 amendment troubled the Second Circuit, which 
refused to directly address the role of willfulness in subsequent decisions as, for 
example,189 in Fendi Adele, S.R.L., where the plaintiff sued another purse 
manufacturer for selling purses containing its trademark.190   Like the Eighth 
and Ninth Circuits, the second circuit applied a presumption of willfulness’ 
requirement to properly assess the defendant’s actions.191 
                                                                                                                   
 180 Id. 
 181 M2 Software Inc. v. Viacom, Inc., 223 Fed. App’x 653 (9th Cir. 2007).  
 182 Id. at 655. 
 183 Id. at 656. 
 184 George Basch Co. v. Blue Coral, Inc., 986 F.2d 1532 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 185 Id. at 1534. 
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. 
 189 Fendi Adele, S.R.L. v. Ashley Reed Trading, Inc., 507 Fed. App’x 26 (2d Cir. 2013).  
 190 Id. 
 191 Id. 
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The Second Circuit’s refusal to define willful infringement’s place in 
disgorgement since the 1999 amendment has deeply divided its lower courts.192  
While some lower courts find that the plain language of the 1999 amendment 
eliminated any previous willfulness requirement,193 the majority of courts within 
the Second Circuit embraced willfulness as a prerequisite for disgorgement 
damages, as in Romag Fasteners, Inc.194  Employing similar reasoning as other 
circuits across the country, some courts emphasize the willfulness requirement’s 
applicability to instances of trademark dilution instead of the infringement of 
non-famous marks.195  Other courts examined the amendment’s language and 
found a literal reading of the text only affected trademark dilution remedies.196   
The Second Circuit exemplifies the confusion inherent in the Lanham Act’s 
1999 amendment.  The circuit steadfastly required a showing of willfulness 
before the amendment.197  Once the amendment changed the language of 
§ 1117, the court explicitly refused to answer a question it could once easily 
answer.198  Because the Second Circuit did not outline the weight to give 
willfulness, the lower courts within the Second Circuit remain split on the issue, 
demonstrating the need to define.199  The role of willfulness when awarding 
disgorgement damages.  
III.  ANALYSIS 
With disgorgement’s increasing popularity as a remedy for trademark 
infringement, courts need a resolution to the long-standing circuit split 
described above.  Providing an answer to this question will ensure mark owners 
and infringers alike are properly affected by disgorgement damages.  In the 
fifteen years since the 1999 Lanham Act amendment, circuit courts approached 
the role of willfulness in disgorgement in three ways: (1) as a requirement, (2) as 
                                                                                                                   
 192 Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 3d 85, 108–09 (D. Conn. 2014). 
 193 Chanel, Inc. v. Veronique Idea Corp., 795 F. Supp. 2d 252, 269 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting that 
“[t]he Court remains persuaded that a showing of willfulness is no longer a prerequisite for an 
award of damages under § 1125(a)”). 
 194 Beastie Boys v. Monster Energy, Co., 983 F. Supp. 354, 364–68 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (upholding 
a willfulness requirement). 
 195 Guthrie Healthcare System v. ContextMedia, Inc., No. 12 Civ. 7992 (KBF), 2014 WL 
185222, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2014); GMA Accessories, Inc. v. BOP, LLC, 765 F. Supp. 2d 
457, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 196 Life Servs. Supplements, Inc. v. Natural Organics, Inc., No. 03 Civ. 6040(SHS), 2007 WL 
4437168, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2007). 
 197 George Basch Co. v. Blue Coral, Inc., 986 F.2d 1540 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 198 Fendi Adele, S.R.L. v. Ashley Reed Trading, Inc., 507 Fed. App’x 26, 31 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 199 Romag Fasteners, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 3d at 108. 
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a mere consideration, or (3) as a nebulous issue worth avoiding.  This Note 
suggests that adopting the first of these approaches would correctly resolve this 
long-standing circuit split for three reasons.   
First, requiring proof of willfulness is consistent with the legislative intent of 
the 1999 amendment.200  Congress only intended to clarify ambiguities within 
the newly created area of federal trademark dilution.201  In fact, Congress’s 
silence on disgorgement damages indicates its desire to retain the existing 
remedial scheme for other forms of trademark misappropriation.202 
Second, an explicit requirement of willfulness would also further the 
remedial theories underlying disgorgement damages.  These rationales include 
compensation, unjust enrichment, and deterrence.203  A key motivation behind 
awarding disgorgement damages is a desire to compensate victims of 
infringement.204  Although complete compensation is nearly impossible, 
providing relief for mark owners is especially justified in instances of willful 
infringement.205  Requiring a showing of willfulness corrects unjust enrichment 
by restoring faith in the market economy, providing remedies to parties affected 
by infringement, and setting an appropriate standard for conducting business.206  
Moreover, a deterrence rationale requires a showing of willfulness infringement 
to adequately stop future wrongful conduct.207 
Third, the legislative history behind the Lanham Act endorses the 
interpretation of willfulness as a requirement.  Advocates of the second 
approach—merely considering willfulness—read the amendment’s language 
differently.  They believe the addition of the word “willful” into the statute 
applied to violations of both trademark dilution and the infringement of non-
famous marks.208  Proponents of willfulness’ abrogation, on the other hand, 
state that Congress intended to punish cybersquatters and clarify the federal 
dilution scheme.209  However, the statute’s legislative history tells a different 
story.   
                                                                                                                   
 200 145 CONG. REC. H6363-01 (daily ed. July 26, 1999). 
 201 Id. (“This legislation is a necessary follow-up to the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 
1995 . . . the bill before us today is necessary to clear up certain issues in the interpretation of the 
dilution act which the Federal courts have grappled with since its enactment.”). 
 202 Romag Fasteners, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 3d at 110–11. 
 203 Corgill, supra note 8, at 1915. 
 204 Conway-Jones, supra note 3, at 879–80. 
 205 Id. at 880. 
 206 Id. at 882. 
 207 Corgill, supra note 8, at 1929. 
 208 Bertagna, supra note 5, at 291. 
 209 Id. 
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In light of these justifications, Congress should amend § 1117 further to 
clarify that the 1999 changes to the statute only apply to dilution offenses, 
thereby explicitly defining willfulness as a requirement for disgorgement 
damages.  In lieu of congressional intervention, the Supreme Court should 
alternatively step in and articulate willfulness’ proper place in the disgorgement 
analysis.  After years of confusion and division, this question deserves a proper 
answer.  Where there is a will, there is a way. 
A.  CONGRESS’S SILENCE CONCERNING WILLFULNESS INDICATES RETAINING A 
WILLFULNESS REQUIREMENT IS PROPER 
When the legislature enacts a statute, it is done with a particular “aim in 
mind.”210  To fully understand Congress’s approach to the 1999 amendment to 
§ 1117 of the Lanham Act, examining the legislative approach to the Lanham 
Act as a whole provides valuable insight into the proper role of willfulness in 
the disgorgement context.  Such an examination shows that Congress’s silence 
on willful infringement in the 1999 amendment does not abrogate the necessity 
of its showing.  Instead, the silence shows a desire to maintain the status quo—
a prevailing requirement of willful infringement before disgorgement damages 
can be awarded to mark owners.  
The Constitution does not expressly provide Congress the authority to 
regulate trademarks.211  However, the legislature has dedicated itself to 
protecting trademark owners since the nineteenth century.  It first attempted to 
codify protections available under the common law in 1881.212  In subsequent 
years, the regulatory landscape of trademark law was increasingly scattered.  It 
was unclear whether the power of trademark regulation belonged to the states 
or the federal government, which led to a scattered collection of laws that 
existed on both levels.213  Congress streamlined this “disorderly patchwork of 
legislation”214 in the Trademark Act of 1905.215 
Over twenty bills proposed amendments to the existing Trademark Act of 
1905 before the Lanham Act was passed in 1946.216  The damages portion of 
these bills reflected the common law perspective on disgorgement, which only 
punished non-innocent infringement.217  While the drafters did not comment 
                                                                                                                   
 210 Id. at 290. 
 211 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 5:3. 
 212 Conway-Jones, supra note 3, at 869. 
 213 Bertagna, supra note 5, at 262. 
 214 Id. 
 215 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 5:3. 
 216 Thurmon, supra note 6, at 299. 
 217 Id. at 301. 
21
Zisek: Where There's a Will, There's a Way: Reconciling Theories of Will
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2015
484 J. INTELL. PROP. L.  [Vol. 22:463 
 
 
on their views of disgorgement in the legislative record, Congress presumably 
wanted to transfer the willfulness requirement into the Lanham Act, as the goal 
of the Lanham Act was to encapsulate certain aspects of the common law.218  
Based on the common law governing trademarks and case law preceding the 
Lanham Act, “one could say with some certainty that a plaintiff in a trademark 
case had to prove deceptive intent to obtain a defendant’s profits.”219 
Congress has amended the Lanham Act twenty times since its passage in 
1946.220  The 1999 amendment sought to clarify confusion surrounding 
dilution.221  However, it was silent as to the amendment’s effect on 
infringement actions involving non-famous marks.  When the Lanham Act was 
amended in 1999, Congress was consciously silent regarding changes beyond 
the dilution context.222  This silence closely resembles Congress’s silence during 
the Lanham Act’s formation.  Congress did not address willfulness in the 
statute directly to retain its prevailing under the common law.223  Therefore, by 
remaining silent, Congress presumably intended to only clarify the portions of 
§ 1117 that pertained to dilution.224  This silence indicates that willfulness was 
not abrogated by the 1999 amendment and courts should require a finding of 
willfulness before awarding disgorgement damages.225 
B.  REMEDIAL THEORIES UNDERLYING DISGORGEMENT OF PROFITS SUPPORT 
A WILLFULNESS REQUIREMENT  
By amending the language of the Lanham Act nearly twenty times during its 
history, Congress intended to protect mark owners to the fullest extent 
possible.226  In the disgorgement context specifically, Congress wanted to 
further various remedial policies, including compensation, unjust enrichment 
and deterrence.227 
1.  Proof of Willfulness Properly Compensates Victims of Trademark Infringement.  
Unfortunately, mark owners cannot be fully compensated through 
                                                                                                                   
 218 Id. at 300. 
 219 Id. at 283. 
 220 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 5:5.  
 221 See supra notes 80–87 and accompanying text. 
 222 Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 3d 85, 109 (D. Conn. 2014). 
 223 Thurmon, supra note 6, at 300. 
 224 Romag Fasteners, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 3d at 109–20 (noting that “[t]he legislative history of the 
1999 amendments supports the view that they addressed only recovery in dilution actions, as the 
history is silent as to any other intended consequence of the amendments”). 
 225 Thurmon, supra note 6, at 300. 
 226 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 5:5. 
 227 Conway-Jones, supra note 3, at 888. 
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disgorgement damages because it would be impossible for mark owners to 
calculate the exact quantity of commercial harm suffered by an infringing 
competitor.228  Nonetheless, principles of compensation are persuasive when 
considering a willfulness requirement in the disgorgement context. 
Theoretically, disgorgement damages can serve as compensatory by 
reimbursing trademark owners for profits lost from an infringer’s actions.229  
However, this theory is only convincing when the mark owner and infringer 
directly compete in the same market230—when these parties are competitors, 
“[t]he defendants’ profit . . . are a rough measure of the plaintiff’s damages.  
Indeed, they are probably the best measure of damages available.”231  A 
compensatory rationale loses its footing, however, when the parties are not in 
economic competition,232 and there is no diversion of sales.233  
Although the compensatory rationale admittedly suffers from shortcomings 
in the disgorgement context, attempts to repay mark owners for their losses also 
seek to offset the mark owner’s loss of goodwill or business reputation from 
infringement.234  This policy would be especially relevant when someone 
infringes willfully.  In that instance, an entity would deliberately seek to divert 
sales away from a competitor through infringement, making such a self-
interested move with the knowledge that such conduct is wrongful.  An award 
of disgorgement damages would therefore make a mark owner whole in light of 
a willful infringer’s actions.  As a result, requiring willfulness before awarding 
disgorgement damages would serve an underlying compensatory purpose, even 
if full compensation is not theoretically possible. 
2.  Proof of Willfulness Corrects Unjust Enrichment.  Another rationale served by a 
willfulness requirement is unjust enrichment, which seeks to return unmerited 
gains from an infringer to the mark owner’s rightful possession.235  It views 
trademark infringement as a violation of property rights rightfully belonging to 
a mark owner.236  This rationale is distinct from compensation, as the gains of 
unjust enrichment could exceed the mark owners’ economic loss.237  In fact, an 
unjust enrichment rationale focuses its evaluation on an infringer’s wrongful 
                                                                                                                   
 228 Id. 
 229 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 30:59. 
 230 Id. 
 231 Id. (quoting Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Craftex, Inc., 816 F.2d 145, 149 (4th Cir. 1987)) (alterations in 
original). 
 232 Corgill, supra note 8, at 1921. 
 233 Id. at 1922. 
 234 Id. at 1917–18. 
 235 See supra notes 109–15 and accompanying text. 
 236 Corgill, supra note 8, at 1931. 
 237 Id. 
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conduct instead of a mark owner’s injury.238  Under an unjust enrichment 
theory, disgorging infringers’ profits seeks to undo gains they did not lawfully 
obtain.239 
At its core, the unjust enrichment rationale serves three purposes.240  First, 
“increase confidence in a democratic market economy”; second, it provides a 
remedy for parties directly and indirectly impacted by infringing activities; third, 
it establishes a proper standard for proper conduct in a competitive business 
environment.241  In addition, unjust enrichment retains some of the principles 
previously available within courts of equity.242  This theory depends on the 
“character of the gains of the infringer and evaluates whether an infringer’s 
profits could be lawfully obtained.”243 
Disgorging profits unjustly retained by an infringer logically applies to 
instances of willful infringement.  An intentional, deliberate violation of a mark 
owner’s property is illegal. Awarding an infringer’s profits deliberately gained 
and wrongfully retained should therefore be returned to mark owners negatively 
affected by infringement, which maintains the faith of consumers and produces 
in the existing market economy.   
Finally, to safeguard against windfalls to the plaintiff, principles of equity 
serve as a check on disgorgement when willfulness is required, as the damages 
are awarded on a case-by-case basis.  Overall, these reasons demonstrate why an 
unjust enrichment rationale supports such a requirement of willfulness before 
awarding an infringer’s profits. 
3.  Proof of Willfulness Deters Future Infringement.  A final remedial policy 
furthered by requiring a showing of willfulness is deterrence of future incidents 
of infringement.244  According to this rationale, disgorgement damages serve as 
a stick to prevent future infringers from being enticed by the carrot of unethical 
and unlawful business practices.245  Like the unjust enrichment rationale, the 
deterrence theory fixates on an infringer’s wrongful conduct instead of a mark 
owner’s injury.246  Deterrence is an attractive aim because it can prevent future 
willful violations of a trademark through disregarding a competitor’s rights, 
belittling a competitor’s mark, and blatantly utilizing a mark despite knowledge 
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of its previous use.247  This theory indicates to the general public that this 
deliberate conduct is wrongful and could be subject to punitive exemplary 
damages, subject to equitable limitations.248  However, a deterrence rationale 
must walk a fine line to adhere to congressional intent.249  The language of the 
Lanham Act prohibits awarding punitive damages solely to punish, so 
disgorgement must serve to deter future infringement without excessively 
punishing infringing parties.250       
The deterrence rationale is particularly persuasive when applied to willful 
infringement.  When infringers “demonstrate[ ] a callous disregard for the rights 
of a competitor and for the mandates of the federal courts,” they should be 
dissuaded from acting so disrespectfully in the future.251  Willful infringement 
can be analogized to wrongful conduct in violation of tort law.252  It is 
presumed that monetary damages would not deter wrongful conduct 
committed innocently without any knowledge of wrongfulness.253  As a result, 
the deterrence rationale demands application to examples of knowing, willful 
infringement.  It prevents infringers from intentionally subverting the 
trademark protection system by misrepresenting information or skirting 
questions.254  Disgorgement damage awards deter and discourage parties hoping 
to undermine business competitors through dishonorable means.     
C.  MERELY VIEWING WILLFULNESS AS A CONSIDERATION DOES NOT 
ACCURATELY REPRESENT CONGRESSIONAL INTENT 
Finally, some courts and commentators maintain that the 1999 amendment 
of § 1117 abrogates a willfulness requirement when awarding a disgorgement 
damage award.255  However, these approaches expand the scope of the 1999 
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amendment beyond its original purpose.256  When the amendment was enacted, 
Congress only contemplated trademark dilution.257  It wanted to limit 
disgorgement’s availability to instances of willful trademark dilution only.258  
Courts like the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits that abrogated a willfulness 
requirement “leverage[ ] this statutory change beyond its intended scope to 
adjust the equities in ordinary infringement cases in order to make it easier for a 
trademark owner to recover profits.”259   
Therefore, although many authorities assert that Congress’s silence 
concerning non-dilutive infringement requires an abrogation of the willfulness 
requirement,260 such silence is consistent with maintaining the status quo in 
trademark matters.261  These proponents of abrogation have unnecessarily 
removed a requirement that a majority of courts have upheld for decades.  This 
view is misguided and unnecessarily complicates legislative intent.  Contrary to 
these assertions, Congress intended to retain willfulness as a requirement and 
courts should thus follow that approach.   
Proponents of abrogation posit that the 1999 amendment served as a 
response to cybersquatters and related trademark dilution offenses instead of 
non-dilutive infringement.262  While the legislative history mentions technology, 
it does not specifically reference cybersquatting or any relevant case law.263  The 
limited nature of the 1999 amendment merely sought to clarify trademark 
dilution matters while keeping the existing disgorgement infrastructure intact.  
As a consequence, maintaining the prevailing willfulness requirement across the 
country is most consistent with congressional intent.  
As recently portrayed in Romag Fasteners, Inc., this interpretation issue has 
generated long-lasting uncertainty for trademark owners and courts.  Either 
Congress or the Supreme Court must resolve any remaining uncertainty.  
Without requiring willfulness in a disgorgement analysis, courts leave 
consumers subject to confusing similarly designated products and mark owners 
subject to damage towards which may not adequately compensate their losses.  
Infringers also will be deterred from unjust gained profits.  The circuit split 
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should be resolved by viewing willfulness as a prerequisite for awarding 
disgorgement damages, not a mere consideration or a question worth avoiding. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The fifteen years following the 1999 amendment of § 1117 have generated a 
scattered map of approaches for considering willfulness providing disgorgement 
damages to trademark owners.  Circuit courts approach willfulness in three 
ways: as either a requirement, a mere equitable consideration, or with 
ambivalence and avoidance.  In light of the persuasive 2014 example of the 
Romag Fasteners decision, future courts should view willfulness as a prerequisite 
for awarding a disgorgement of an infringer’s profits. 
This approach first comports with congressional intent and furthers relevant 
remedial policies.  Congress’s silence regarding non-dilutive remedies does not, 
as some courts and commentators argue, indicate a desire to abrogate 
willfulness’s requirement.  Rather, it demonstrates a desire to maintain the 
common law’s status quo.  Before the 1999 amendment to the Lanham Act, 
most common law courts considering disgorgement damages required a 
showing of willfulness, hesitant to punish innocent infringement.  Therefore, 
the legislature’s refusal to address the role of willfulness in non-famous 
infringement actions demonstrates its desire to retain the requirement.  
Second, viewing willfulness as a prerequisite is also consistent with the 
remedial policies of compensation, unjust enrichment, and deterrence.  
Although the total damages suffered by a mark owner are nearly impossible to 
calculate, a disgorgement remedy can compensate a mark owner by providing 
an estimate of the economic harm to the owner.  An unjust enrichment 
rationale seeks to return commercial gains from wrongful activities to their 
rightful owner—trademark owners themselves.  Finally, disgorgement’s 
availability as a remedy also removes incentives for infringement, thereby 
deterring future harm at the expense of trademark owners.  
The courts and commentators alternatively abrogating a willfulness 
requirement misinterpret the scope of the language in the 1999 amendment and 
instead rely on issues like cybersquatting that were not contemplated by the 
existing § 1117 infrastructure.  Accepting Congress’s intentional silence in the 
1999 amendment to maintain the status quo while furthering policies of 
compensation, unjust enrichment, and deterrence demands that willfulness 
serve as a prerequisite for disgorgement damages in the trademark context.  
Where there’s willful infringement, there’s a way to properly assess 
disgorgement damages on behalf of mark owners. 
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